Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 35
Issue 2 35:2 (2012) Special Issue: Hugh M.
Kindred: A Tribute

Article 5

10-1-2012

The EU as an Arctic Power: Analysis of the Competence of the EU
in the Arctic by Policy Areas
Armand de Mestral
McGill University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Law of the Sea Commons

Recommended Citation
Armand de Mestral, "The EU as an Arctic Power: Analysis of the Competence of the EU in the Arctic by
Policy Areas" (2012) 35:2 Dal LJ 329.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Armand de Mestral*

The EU as an Arctic Power: Analysis of the
Competence of the EU in the Arctic by
Policy Areas

The European Union is not generally perceived as an Arctic power However, the
ever-expanding list of EU competences implies that it will have both an interest in
participating in the governance of the Arctic and the authority to do so, should the
seven Arctic states agree to make room. This development holds both challenges
and opportunities for Canada and other Arctic states. The challenges stem from
the fact that the EU will seek to promote the economic interests of its Member States
in resource extraction and freedom of navigation where Canada and Russia, in
particular, have asserted strong national policies. The opportunities lie in the fact
that the EU is likely to support strong environmental protection and to be ready
to finance enhanced scientific research. Having incurred the wrath of indigenous
peoples of the Arctic with its seal products ban, the EU faces particular difficulties
in trying to participate in the Circumpolar Conference.
L'Union europdenne nest g~neralement pas considdr6e comme une puissance
arctique. Cependant, la liste toujours en croissance des compdtences de lUE
signifie qu'elle aura I la fois intrt A participer A la gouvernance de l'Arctique
et I'autorit6 pour le faire si les sept Etats arctiques I'acceptent. Cette situation
presente tant des ddfis que des possibilitbs pour le Canada et les autres pays
arctiques. Les ddfis ddcoulent du fait que lUE cherchera A promouvoir les intbr~ts
6conomiques de ses Etats membres pour ce qui est de Iextraction des ressources
et de la libert6 de navigation alors que le Canada et Russie en particulier ont
fait valoir de fortes politiques nationales. Les possibilitbs viennent de ce qu'il est
probable que lUE appuie des mesures fortes de protection de l'environnement
et qu'elle soit disposde A financer une recherche scientifique accrue. Aprbs avoir
provoqu6 la coldre des peuples indighnes de IArctique avec son interdiction des
produits du phoque, I'UE fait face A des difficult6s particulibres alors qu'elle tente
de participer A la Conference circumpolaire.
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Introduction
The involvement of the European Union (EU) in the Arctic has increased
considerably over the last years. There has been the discovery of new
opportunities to exploit the resources of the region due to the reduction
of the volume of ice as a consequence of climate change, and the region
has thus acquired a strategic importance for the EU as well as for the
other Arctic stakeholders. Few think of the EU as an Arctic power
today, nevertheless this may change in the future. As the EU defines its
international personality and expands its fields of action, it is gradually
being drawn into debates concerning the governance of the Arctic region.
Two EU member states, Sweden and Finland, have territory in the Arctic
Circle. A third, Denmark, is the sovereign over Greenland although, by
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agreement, Greenland is not included within the ambit of EU law and
competence. Through its association with Norway and Iceland in the
European Economic Area (EEA), much EU law extends to their Arctic
regions. Thus, by virtue of territory alone, the EU is becoming an Arctic
power. Beyond this, the EU has various competences which may ultimately
be exercised in the Arctic and it unquestionably has significant long-term
economic and political interests that will move it in the same direction.
The Arctic Council' was established in 1996 within the context of the
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy,2 and has served as a primary
forum for cooperation among the seven Arctic States.' The increase in the
importance of the Arctic region has induced these and other countries and
political entities to strengthen their Arctic policies. The EU has made a first,
unsuccessful, attempt to be granted observer status in the Arctic Council.'
China and Japan are said to be contemplating requests for observer status
as well. In May 2008 the five Arctic. coastal countries (U.S.A., Russia,
Canada, Denmark, and Norway) signed the Ilulissat Declaration' in which
they rejected the need to create a broader international legal framework
to govern the Arctic Ocean, claiming that its governance would be best
carried out by them in a mutual cooperative manner, in accordance with
international law. The EU has moved to expand its power in the Arctic,
through a twofold strategy: on one hand, it has attempted to make
diplomatic steps to be included in Arctic governance; on the other hand,
it has developed new policies designed to allow it to exercise various
competences in the Arctic region.
Currently, there are three different ways in which EU policies can
affect the Arctic region. The first is through the direct application of EU
policies within the Arctic region: the North of Sweden and Finland are
within the Arctic Circle and therefore, in principle, EU policies apply
without distinction there, as they do elsewhere within the EU legal space.6
Another example of direct application of EU policies can be found in the
EU's research programs devoted to the Arctic: these programs, which may

I . The Declarationon the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 19 September 1996,35 ILM 1387.
2.
Arctic EnvironmentalProtectionStrategy, 14 June 1991, 30 ILM 1624.
3.
This includes: USA, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia.
4.
Arctic Council, "Tromso Declaration," 6th Ministerial Meeting (29 April 2009), online: Arctic
Council <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/>.
5.
The llulissat Declaration,28 May 2008, 48 ILM 382 [Ilulissat].
6.
EU policies would normally apply to the Arctic Circle because of Denmark as well: Greenland
which is under Danish sovereignty is also an Arctic coastal country. However, Greenland is not subject
to EU law even if it is subject to Danish sovereignty because it has been excluded by agreement
from the EU. See EC, Council Decision2001/822/EC of27 November 2001 on the association of the
overseas countriesand territorieswith the European Community, [2001] OJ, L 314/1.
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be carried out in the Arctic or in EU member states, are typically aimed
at scientific research on the consequences of human activities within the
EU on the environment of the Arctic region. EU policies can also affect
the Arctic region through the Agreement on the European Economic Area
(EEA Agreement). The EEA Agreement extends the EU internal market to
three of the four European Free Trade Association (EFTA) States, two of
which, Norway and Iceland, lie in the Arctic.' This has the consequential
effect of extending EU law and policy to a broader area of the Arctic.
Finally, many EU policies apply in the Arctic as a result of the external
projection of all domestic policies. As a result, the EU is party to numerous
multilateral instruments concerning, inter alia, the fisheries, environmental
protection and maritime transportation.
I. Elaborationof an EUArcticpolicy
The EU has in recent years increasingly adopted measures regarding the
Arctic. This is demonstrated in the papers and communications adopted by
the European Commission (Commission) and the Council of the European
Union (Council). These documents constitute the beginning of what is
destined to be a comprehensive EU policy for the Arctic. In March 2008
the Commission delivered a paper on Climate Change and International
Security.' This document identifies the Arctic as one of the regions where
climate change is posing a threat to international security, in particular
potential conflicts over resources. One of the recommendations is to
"develop an EU Arctic policy based on the evolving geo-strategy of the
Arctic region, taking into account i.e. access to resources and the opening
of new trade routes." 9 Afterwards, the European Parliament adopted a
resolution on Arctic governance, 0 in which it expresses its concerns about
the environmental, geo-strategical and social consequences of climate
change in the Arctic. The resolution also provided the elements for the
foundation of a meaningful EU Arctic policy.

7. The EEA is principally concerned with the four fundamental pillars of the internal market
(freedom of movement of goods, persons, services and capitals), but also side policies, such as social
policy, consumer protection and environment policy. Agriculture and fishery policies are excluded due
to the reluctance of Iceland and Norway to accept them. See Agreement on the European Economic
Area, 2 May 1992, 1801 UNTS 3, [1994] OJ LI/3, (entered into force 1 January 1994) [EEA
Agreement].
8. EC, High Representative & European Commission, S 113/08, Climate Change and International
Security: Paperfromthe High Representativeand the EuropeanCommission to the European Council,
(14 March 2008), online: Council of the European Union <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/99387.pdf >.
9.
Ibid at 11.
10. EC, European Parliamentresolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance, (2008) Eur Parl
Doc P6 TA(2008)0474, online: The European Parliament < http://www.europarl.europa.eu/>.
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In November 2008, the Commission adopted a Communication on
"The European Union and the Arctic Region."" The purpose of this
policy document is to achieve a "structured and coordinated approach"
regarding "Arctic matters," "as a first step" towards defining a complete
EU Arctic policy. The policy objectives referred to in the Communication
are contained in three macro-objectives: "protecting and preserving the
Arctic in unison with its population, promoting the sustainable use of
resources, and contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance."12
In December 2009, the Council adopted "conclusions" on Arctic issues in
which it "welcomes the gradual formulation of a policy on Arctic issues
to address EU interests and responsibilities, while recognising Member
States' legitimate interests and rights in the Arctic."" Finally, in January
2011 the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on a sustainableEU
policy for the High North.14 The Resolution affirms the EU's position as
an Arctic power and calls for a united and coordinated EU policy on the
Arctic region in order to meet the challenges posed by the Arctic. These
measures adopted by the Commission and the Council demonstrate the
EU's interest in establishing a policy on the Arctic region.
II. The external competence of the EU on the Arctic
As briefly discussed above, the EU can potentially act in the Arctic through
its external competence. To understand how and why the EU can act in
this manner in the Arctic one must first understand how the EU is legally
entitled to act beyond the national borders of its Members States. In this
section, the evolution of the EU external competence, and its limitations,
will be illustrated.
The external competence of the EU has developed gradually over
a number of years and it is still a work in progress. The broad outlines
of the external competence have been developed by the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU), formerly the European Court of Justice
(ECJ), throughout its case law and opinions as well as by the Council's
and Commission's practice. The latter two institutions have been joined
11. EC, Communicationfrom the Commission to the European Parliamentand the Council-The
European Union and the Arctic Region, COM(2008) 763 final [Commission Communication on the
Arctic].
12. The Commission's Communication was approved by the Council in December 2008. At time of
writing, a second policy document is expected from the Commission.
13. EC, Council of the European Union, Press Release, Council Conclusions on Arctic Issues:
2985th Foreign Affairs Council meeting (8 December 2009), online: Council of the European Union,
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsData/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/ 11814.pdf>.
14. EC, EuropeanParliamentresolution of20 January2011 on a sustainableEUpolicyfor the High
North, (2011) EU Parl Doc TA(2011)0024, online: The European Parliament <http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/>.
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by the European Parliament in defining the EU external action and foreign
policy as a result of changes made by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.
The CJEU has contributed significantly to the development of
the concept of the EU's external competence through the principles of
parallelism and complementarity. In the absence of a closed list of external
competences in the treaties, CJEUhas over the years elaborated the principle
of parallelism: the external competence of the EU reflects the projection
of its internal competences. In addition, the CJEU introduced the principle
of complementarity, according to which the EU has external competence
when the exercise is necessary for the effective implementation of its
internal policies." In the ERTA case the ECJ consolidated the concept of
the external projection of exclusive external competences by stating that
when the "[c]ommunity, with a view to implementing a common policy
envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules...
the Member States no longer have the right.. .to undertake obligations with
third countries which affect those rules." 6 In the Inland Waterways Vessel"
opinion, the ECJ further extended the exclusive external competence by
stating that the EU also has exclusive external competence in the absence
of an internal power, as long as the international agreement is necessary
for the attainment of the common policy."
Conversely, in Opinion 1/94 the Court adopted a very significant
limitation to EU's external competence by holding that if an international
agreement to which the EU becomes party covers policies falling outside of
the scope of EU's competence, then this does not give rise to an exclusive
external competence. '9 In these circumstances, the external competence is
shared between the EU and its Member States. The Marrakech Agreement,
establishing the WTO is an example of shared competence: it falls within
the category of "mixed agreements" due to the fact that both the European
Community (EC) and its Member States signed it and are members of the
WTO.
The Treaty of Lisbon has codified the list of EU external competences.
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in fact,
states in Article 3.2 that:
The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion
of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in
15. Kramer, C-3/76, [1976] ECR 1-1279.
16. Commission v Council, C-22/70, [1971] ECR 1- 263 at para 17.
17. European Laying-Up Fundfor Inland Waterways Vessel, Opinion 1/76, [1977] ECR 1-741, at
paras 4-5.
18. Ibid.
19. Opinion 1/94 WTO, [1994] ECR 1-5267.
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a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to
exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect
common rules or alter their scope.2 0
Furthermore, TFEU art 216.1 provides that:
[t]he Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries
or international organizations where the Treaties so provide, or where the
conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the
framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in
the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely
to affect common rules or alter their scope.
The legislative and policy-making processes applicable to EU's
external competences vary considerably depending on the treaty basis of

the power being exercised. In some policy areas the EU has exclusive
internal/external competence (such as in the case of the conservation of
marine biological resources), whereas in other policy areas the competence
is shared between Member States and the Union (such as in the case of
maritime shipping and navigation). In other limited circumstances, as in

the policy area of tourism, the competence of the EU is limited to support
or coordinate the actions of Member States.
In addition, the Parliament's role in the conclusion of international
agreements is established in Art. 218.6(a) TFEU and the Parliament's
consent is required in case of:
(i)
(ii)

association agreements;
agreement on Union accession to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
(iii) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by
organizing cooperation procedures;
(iv) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union;

(v)

agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative
procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where
consent by the European Parliament is required.2'

Thus, for policies falling outside of the list above, the Parliament has
only consultative powers.22
In the Titanium Dioxide case the ECJ ruled that, in determining the
legal basis for the exercise of the EU external relations power, the potential

20. EC, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the Functioning ofthe European Union, [2010] OJ,
L 83/02 at art 3.2 [TFEU].
21. Ibid, art 218.6(a).
22. Ibid, art 218.6(b).
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consequences for the Parliament should be taken into consideration.23 This
ruling is relevant for cases in which a specific act of the Union may fall
under two legal bases, one falling within the scope of Art. 218.6(a) and
the other within the scope of Art. 218.6(b). In these cases, preponderance
should be given to the legal basis that guarantees a law-making process in
which the Parliament has a greater role, notably sub 218.6(a).
In conclusion, it has become clear that the EU foreign affairs power
involves both exclusive and shared competences, as well as an expanding
procedural dimension involving the role of an increasingly active European
Parliament in the conclusion of international agreements.
1. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and relatedregional
fishery management organizations
The EU is a party to various international instruments covering different
policy sectors, which are relevant for the EU's competence over the Arctic.
The Third UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
is the most relevant international instrument for maritime matters.
UNCLOS provides for the participation of international organizations in
the Convention in circumstances where member states have transferred
competence over those matters covered by the Convention24 and in cases
where the "majority of its relevant member states are signatories of this
Convention."25 All 27 EU member states are party to the Convention and
the EC (now the EU) has been member since 1984.26
Under EU law the UNCLOS is a "mixed treaty," because it
covers matters falling both under national exclusive competence (the
determination of territorial sea) and community matters (Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and fisheries). In 1998, the EU (through a Council
decision) issued a declaration confirming the EU's adhesion to the
Convention.2 7 The declaration addresses issues of competence between
EU and Member States by stating that "Member States have transferred
competence to it with regard to the conservation and management of sea

23. Commission v Council, Case C-300/89, [1991] ECR I-2867.
24. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 art 305(1)
(f) and Annex IX (entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS].
25. Ibid, at art 2 Annex IX.
26. "[...] The EC deposited its instrument of formal confirmation only in April 1998, becoming then
a full member." See Robin Churchill & Daniel Owen, The EC Common Fisheries Policy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010) at 317.
27. EC, Council Decision 98/392/EC of23 March 1998 concerningthe conclusion by the European
Community of the United Nations Convention of 10 December 1982 on the Law of the Sea and the
Agreement of 28 July 1994 relating to the implementation of Part XI thereof [1998] OJ L 179/1,
Annex 2 [Declaration].
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fishing resources."2 8 Thus the EU can adopt relevant legislation which
must be enforced by its Member States. This competence also enables
the EU to "enter into external undertakings with third states or competent
international organizations."29
The Declaration further indicates that the EU's competence "applies
to waters under national fisheries jurisdiction and to the high seas.""o This
section of the Declaration thus addresses EU's competence regarding
the geographical scope of the management of sea fishing resources. The
declaration continues (in point 1) by stating that:
in respect of measures relating to the exercise of jurisdiction over
vessels, flagging and registration of vessels and the enforcement of penal
and administrative sanctions, competence rests with the Member States
whilst respecting Community law. Community law also provides for
administrative sanctions.
Finally, as for matters concerning maritime transport, the declaration
states:
With regard to the provisions on maritime transport, safety of shipping
and the prevention of marine pollution contained inter alia in Parts II,
III, V, VII and XII of the Convention, the Community has exclusive
competence only to the extent that such provisions of the Convention
or legal instruments adopted in implementation thereof affect common
rules established by the Community. When Community rules exist but are
not affected, in particular in cases of Community provisions establishing
only minimum standards, the Member States have competence, without
prejudice to the competence. of the Community to act in this field.
Otherwise competence rests with the Members States.3
According to Churchill and Owen, this declaration designates EU
competence over fishing vessels in a manner that may not be in conformity
with the EU's practice, because measures relating to the exercise of
jurisdiction by the flag State over its vessels on the high sea fall within
the competence of Member States. They argue that "[a] number of the
RFMOs (Regional Fishery Management Organizations) that the EC
joined to the exclusion of its Member States before the mid-1990s have
provisions on the exercise of flag State jurisdiction on the high seas and

28. "The Community points out that its Member States have transferred competence to it with regard
to the conservation and management of sea fishing resources," ibid, point 1.
29. Ibid, point 1.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid, point 2.
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have developed schemes of international inspection." 32 Here, the authors
make reference to the Scheme of Control and Enforcement of the NorthEast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), which includes provisions
on inspection and port state control of foreign fishing vessels." The EU is
a contracting party of the NEAFC, but its Member States are not (with the
exception of Denmark, in respect of the territories of Greenland and Faroe
Islands). NEAFC provisions on inspection and exercise of the flag State
jurisdiction have been implemented by the EU with Regulation 2791/1999,
whose legal basis is Art. 43 TFEU (former Art. 37 EC Treaty), agricultural
policy, which is a shared competence between EU and Member States.
The Council sought to narrow the scope of the EU's exclusive treatymaking powers in order to safeguard the residual competences of Member
States. According to the Commission, the exclusive competence of the EC
on the conservation of fishing resources had to be interpreted so broadly
as to cover the conditions for the granting of nationality to fishing vessels,
vessels inspection and responsibility of the flag States. The Commission
took the matter to the ECJ.
In Commission v Ireland (C-459/03) the ECJ held that in areas where
EU rules existed, a transfer of competence took place when the EU became
party to UNCLOS merely by virtue of its membership.34 Where there
were no EU rules, competence remained with the Member States. While
the marine environment falls within the EU's competence,3 5 the Court
recognized that competences in this field are "in principle, shared between
the Community and Member States." 6 According to the Court, however,
...the question as to whether a provision of a mixed agreement comes
within the competence of the Community is one which relates to the
attribution and, thus, the very existence of that competence, and not to
its exclusive or shared nature."
This case lays down the principle that "as soon as the EC starts acting
on the subject matter of a 'mixed agreement,' [...] everything provided
for in the agreement becomes ipso facto an integral part of the community

32. Robin Churchill & Daniel Owen, The EC Common FisheriesPolicy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010) at 311 (footnote omitted).
33. See NEAFC, NEAFC Scheme of Controland Enforcement, online: NEAFC <http://www.neafc.
org/scheme>.
34. Commission v Ireland,C-459/03, [2006] ECR 1-4635 at para 105-108 [Commission v Ireland
(C-459/03)].
35. TFEU, supra note 20, art 191. This article is former art 174 EC Treaty.
36. Commission v Ireland(C-459/03), supranote 34, at para 92.
37. Ibidatpara.93.
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legal order." 38 This decision extends the external powers of the EU at the
expense of Member States and it has clear effects on the fishery policy
sector which, in turn, may be relevant for the Arctic. To conclude, the
decision of the ECJ and the practice of the EU suggest that the Union can
expand its external competence in the field of fisheries, including powers
of inspection and control of vessels flying the flag of an EU member
state. This expansion of the EU's external competence may likely have an
impact on its competence in the Arctic because fisheries could become an
important economic activity in the region. Thus, in 2008 the Commission,
in its Communication on the Arctic,39 contemplated the possibility of the
NEAFC extending its mandate into the Arctic Ocean, in the absence of a
RFMO for the Arctic Ocean.
2. The InternationalMaritime Organization
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the main specialized UN
agency dealing with maritime transport and it is also the agency entrusted
with maritime standard-setting functions (conventions, codes, etc). The
IMO deals with subject areas such as, inter alia, pollution from ships,
ballast water management, safety of life at sea, and collision prevention,
over which competence is shared between the EU and the Member States. 40
The "IMO is currently developing a draft International code of safety for
ships operating in polar waters (Polar Code), which would cover the full
range of design, construction, equipment, operational, training, search and
rescue and environmental protection matters relevant to ships operating"
in the Arctic and Antarctic.4 ' The EU has no direct representation at the
IMO, and it has not acceded to any of its Conventions, although most EU
Member States have done so. This is because the IMO Convention does
not have a Regional Economic Integration Organization (REIO) clause
that would permit the Union's accession as member. Even though the
Commission has held an observer status since 1974, the voice of the EU
within the IMO can only be mediated by its Member Sates.

38. On this specific point see Cesare Romano, "Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland" (2007) 101
Am J Int'I L 171 at 176.
39. Commission Communicationon the Arctic, supra note 11 at para 3.2.
40. EC, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies: EU Competencies
Affecting the Arctic (28 October 2010) at 23, online: European Parliament <http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/committees/en/afet/studiesdownload.htmllanguageDocument-EN&file=33381>.
41. International Maritime Organization, Development of a Mandatory Polar Code-Update on
Progress(IMO, 2011), online: International Maritime Organization <http://www.imo.org/mediacentre/
hottopics/polar/>.
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3. Internationalinstruments concerning environmentalprotection
The EU is party to numerous multilateral instruments for the protection
of the environment. 42 As discussed above, both the Member States and
the EU are parties to international instruments falling within the shared
competence of environmental protection. The EU exercises exclusive
competence over matters falling within internal market and international
trade policies, for example the prohibitions and restrictions of production
and trade of persistent organic pollutants. 4 3 In other circumstances the
EU has to work jointly with Member States to promote international
environmental protection policies.
III. The integratedmaritime policy (IMP)
The Commission's 2007 Communication An IntegratedMaritime Policy
for the European Union (IMP), explicitly endorsed by the European
Council," aims at creating an overarching framework to promote a
coherent and coordinated development of different sectoral policies
related to maritime affairs, including environmental protection, fisheries,
maritime transport, tourism and marine scientific research. Many aspects
of the IMP have potential relevance for the Arctic, such as development
of tools for surveillance and data collection, action to reduce pollution
from ships and action for sustainable maritime tourism.4 5 Airoldi discusses
the inevitable external dimension of the IMP: "[w]hile the IMP has a
predominantly internal EU dimension, marine ecosystems and economics
transcend boundaries, adding an obvious external dimension." 46 The
Commission, in its 2009 communication on the external dimension of the

42. The most relevant are: the United Nations Environmental Programme; the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change; the Kyoto Protocol; the LOS Convention, including the
provisions on the International Seabed Authority; the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North Atlantic and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
and the Convention on Biological Diversity.
43. EC, CouncilDecision 2006/507/EC of 14 October 2004 concerningthe conclusion, on behalfof
the European Community, of the Stockholm Convention on PersistentOrganicPollutants,[2006] OJ L
209/1.
44. Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council 14 December 2007: Presidency
Conclusions (14 February 2008) 16616//1/07 rev 1, at para 58, online: <http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf>.
45. Adele Airoldi, European Union and the Arctic. Policies and Actions (Copenhagen: Nordic
Council of Ministers, 2010) at 72.
46. Ibid at 39.
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IMP, stressed that the external dimension cannot be ignored.4 7 The 2010
Report on IntegratedMaritimePolicy of the European Parliament endorses
the "Commission's October 2009 package on the IMP."4 8 Furthermore,
the Parliament "calls... on the European Commission and the Member
States to further develop the potential offered by the different maritime
sectors by drawing up an ambitious 'blue growth' strategy"4 9 and asks
the Commission to elaborate an "overarching, cross-sectoral strategy for
sustainable growth in coastal regions and maritime sectors by 2013.""o
In November 2011, the European Parliament and the Council of the
European Union passed Regulation 1255/2011, establishing a Programme
to further support the development of an Integrated Maritime Policy.5'
Under this Integrated Maritime Policy, third countries are requested to
ratify and implement UNCLOS. The Commission is also encouraged to
work in close cooperation with Member States on an integrated approach
with third countries (and non-state actors in third countries) sharing a sea
basin with the Member States of the Union. Due to the proximity of the
EU waters to the Arctic, it is clear that the expansion of the EU's external
competence in the field of maritime policy represents an opportunity for
the EU to affect the Arctic region. In fact, many aspects of the IMP have
47. See EC, Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the RegionsDeveloping the international dimension of the Integrated Maritime Policy of the European Union,
COM(2009) 536 final (15 September 2009) at 3. In this communication, the Commission indicates
that issues such as "climate change, biodiversity loss, sustainable use of marine resources, [and]
fair competition in shipping and shipbuilding" need to be "addressed [with] robust international
cooperation," which can have either a global or a regional scope depending on the specific issue.
48. EC, European Parliament, Report on Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP)-Evaluation ofProgress
made and New Challenges (5 October 2010) at 6/24, para 1.
49. Ibid at 6/24.
50. Ibidat 6/24, para 3. The Report also calls for an "integrated approach to strengthening Europe's
world leadership in marine and maritime research, technology development and maritime engineering
across sectors such as shipbuilding, the sustainable development of marine resources, clean shipping
and off-shore energy development and technologies," and expresses the need to find "solutions...
at the international level to eradicate unfair competition practices within the shipbuilding industry."
It also urges the Commission to "extend the mandate of the European Maritime Safety Agency
(EMSA) on safety inspections of off-shore installations and the cleaning up of oil spills" in the EU
EEZ. It also calls for "review of the EMSA Regulation" and asks the Commission to investigate
whether EMSA's mandate should be extended to environmental liability and "whether it should be
assigned responsibility for monitoring compliance with safety standards in off-shore oil extraction and
reviewing contingency plans in that regard." Ibid at 6/24.
51. Among its objectives are, inter alia, "foster[ing] the development and implementation of
integrated governance of maritime and coastal affairs;" "promoting the protection of the marine
environment;" "improve[ing] and enhance[ing] external cooperation and coordination in relation to
the objectives of the IMP, on the basis of advancing debate within international forums." See EC,
Regulation (EU) No 1255/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2011
establishing a Programme to support the further development of an Integrated Maritime Policy Text
with EEA relevance, [2011] OJ L32 1/1 at art 2(e).
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potential relevance for the Arctic, such as, inter alia, development of tools
for surveillance and data collection, action to reduce pollution from ships,
action for sustainable maritime tourism.52
IV. Maritimeshipping
TFEU establishes that transport policy is shared between Member States
and the EU. 3 This policy includes also freedom to provide services in
the field of transport.5 4 The EU may establish "common rules applicable
to, [among others], international transport to or from the territory of a
Member state" as well as "conditions [under which] non-resident carriers
serv[e] the EU" and "measures to improve transport safety."55
Since transport is a shared competence, the EU is entitled to regulate
policy areas that are already "covered" by EU legislation. Thus, the EU
acquires external competence in matters regulated internally within the
Union. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the 2010 study by the DirectorateGeneral for External Policies of the Union, EU Competences Affecting the
Arctic,
...in the case of the Union abstaining from exercising its competence
within the field of transport, Member States can act individually
respecting the principle of cooperation and refraining from taking any
measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the
EU legislation. Most probably, the limits for States' flexibility to act in

this context will be drawn from practice and/or newly developed case
6

law.s

In addition, EU legislation covers maritime safety and the prevention
of pollution from ships," rules for ship inspection," port state control,59

52. This aspect has been underlined in Adele Airoldi's text: while the IMP has a predominantly
internal EU dimension, marine ecosystems and economics transcend boundaries, adding an obvious
external dimension. See Adele Airoldi, European Union and the Arctic. Main developments July
2008-July 2010 (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2010) at 39.
53. TFEU, supra note 20, art 4, Title VI.
54. Ibid, art 58, Chapter 3.
55. Ibid, art 91(a), (b), (c).
56. EC, European Parliament, Directorate-Generalfor External Policies: EU Competencies
affecting the Arctic, (28 October 2010), online: European Parliament <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
committees/sv/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument-SV&file=33381> at 22.
57. EC, Directive2002/84/EC of the European Parliamentand of the Council of 5 November 2002
amending the Directives on maritime safety and the prevention ofpollutionfrom ships, [2002] OJ L
324/53.
58. EC, Council Directive 94/57/EC of November 1994 on common rules and standardsfor ship
inspection andsurvey organizations andfor the relevant activities ofmaritime administrators,[1994]
OJ L319/20.
59. EC, Directive2009/16/EC of the European Parliamentand the Council of23 April 2009 on port
State control, [2009] OJ L 131/57.
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improvement of performance of Member States as flag states6 oand liability
of carriers 61 and vessel traffic monitoring and information system. 62 The
Vessel Traffic Monitoring & Information Systems (VTMIS) Directive also
includes risk management measures in the event of sea-ice: the directive
identifies the Member States that are responsible for providing proper
information on ice conditions. According to Dir. 59/2002 (as amended
by Dir. 17/2009), Member States' authorities recommend routes and icebreaking services, and are empowered to request certifications for the
strength and other requirements commensurate to the ice conditions in
areas in which ships operate. 63 These powers apply to any operator, agent
or master of a ship bound to a port of a Member State (Art. 4) and in the
area of competence of each Member State (Art. 18(a)).
The EU competence in the field of transport is of particular significance
due to the importance of commercial shipping for the economy and the
environment of the region: this potentially involves greater pressure to
open maritime corridors and straits in the Arctic in future years. Through
the Commission's Communication,"4 the EU expresses the will to
contribute to the development of the Arctic's commercial shipping and
the improvement of maritime surveillance capabilities in the North." The
competence of the EU over maritime transport may also have a partial
legal grounding in other areas, such as environmental protection (shared)
and competition (exclusive). According to the jurisprudence of the ECJ on
the choice of legal basis, cited above, the choice must be made considering
the role of the European Parliament in the decision-making process. Given
the Parliament's strong interest in environmental issues, this suggests that
the environmental challenges posed by maritime transportation may well
be at the top of EU's Arctic agenda.

60. EC, Directive 2009/21/EC of the European Parliamentand the Council of 23 April 2009 on
compliance withflag State requirements, [2009] OJ L 131/132.
61. EC, RegulationNo 392/2009 ofthe EuropeanParliamentand ofthe Council of23 April 2009 on
the liability ofcarrierofpassengers by sea in the event ofaccidents, [2009] OJ L 131/24.
62. EC, Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliamentand of the Council of 27 June 2002
establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system and repealing Council
Directive 93/75/EEC, [2002] OJ L 208/10; amended by Directive 2009/17/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2002/59/EC establishing a
Community vessel traffic monitoringand informationsystem, [2009] OJ L 131/101.
63. Ibidat 24. Art 18(1)(a) from amended 2009/17/EC, section (10).
64. See Commission Communication on the Arctic, supranote 11.
65. The Communication also mentions the possibility of developing a polar-orbiting satellite system
and the option of using the Galileo satellite navigation system to improve navigation safety, maritime
surveillance and emergency response; ibid at 8, "Proposals of Action," online: <http://eeas.europa.eu/
arctic region/docs/com_08_763_en.pdf>.
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V. Fisheries
The Common Fishery Policy applies to fisheries and related activities
"practised on the territory of Member States or in Community waters
or by Community fishing vessels or, without prejudice to the primary
responsibility of the flag State, nationals of Member States."66 The
Community waters are subsequently defined by the basic Regulation as
"the waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Member States
with the exception of waters adjacent to the territories mentioned in Annex
II to the Treaty."6 ' The exclusion in the definition of Community waters
refers to the Overseas Countries and Territories of the Member States.
6 t the Court stated that "[a]s institutional acts
In Commission v Ireland,
adopted on the basis of the Treaty, the Regulations apply in principle to
the same geographical area as the Treaty itself."69 Therefore, the Common
Fishery Policy applies to the entire extent of the Community waters,
including "waters beyond the territorial sea that are subject to coastal
State jurisdiction," notably the "exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and/or
exclusive fishing zone (EFZ)."o Unlike competence over shipping, the
EU competence over fisheries is not limited to the EU EEZ and territorial
and internal waters. EU competence over the Common Fisheries Policy
also follows fishing vessels registered in EU states whereever they may
be, including in the Arctic.
Questions arise about the extent to which the seabed, as opposed to the
water column, is covered by the definition of "Community waters" with
respect to the seabed of the EEZ and EFZ, since these zones are not part of
the Member States' territory. The distinction made by the basic regulation
between Community waters and Member States' territory may serve as
guidance to infer that the Community waters include the seabed within
200 nm from the coastline of the Member States. Under international law,
a coastal State has exclusive sovereign rights to exploit sedentary species
on its continental shelf, including the outer shelf (beyond 200 nm). 1 Does
the fishery policy apply to the outer continental shelf as well? It has to
be noted that the continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil and
has no water column element, therefore it may be difficult to argue that

66. EC, Council Regulation EC No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and
sustainable exploitation offisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, [2002] OJ L
358/59 at art (2).
67. Ibid, Art 3(a).
68. Commission v Ireland,C-61/77, [1978] ECR 1-417.
69. Ihid at para 46.
70. See Churchill & Owen, supra note 32 at 63.
71. UNCLOS, supranote 24 at art 76(5).

The EU as an Arctic power: Analysis of the Competence
of the EU in the Arctic by Policy Areas

345

the outer continental shelf, which has no water column component, falls
within Community waters. Nevertheless, art. 9.3.a of Council Decision
2001/431 clearly implies that it does.72 Another example is Directive
2008/56/EC establishing a framework for community action in the field of
marine environmental policy. 73
In addition, the "Green Paper" on Reform of the Common Fisheries
Policy of 22 April 2009 explicitly refers to the external dimension of
the CFP, and proposes the management of the fishing activities of "EU
fleets in non-EU waters," in order "to extend the principles of sustainable
and responsible fisheries internationally." 74 The Reform of the Common
Fisheries Policy also expresses the idea that "[o]ther objectives that
currently guide the external dimension of the CFP, such as maintaining the
presence of an EU fleet internationally and ensuring that this fleet supply
the EU market, may be less relevant today."7 Even more significantly, the
European Commission states that "the sheer importance of the EU market
in world trading of fisheries products provides sufficient legitimacy for
our action in regional and other multilateral fora." The Reform of the
Common Fisheries Policy shows that in the Commission's view, this
policy encompasses non-EU waters and that EU policy should be guided
by principles of sustainable and responsible fishing. Unfortunately, the fact
that Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies are not covered by the
EEA Agreement may reduce in part the impact of that policy in the Arctic
region. For this reason the CFP does not apply to Norway or Iceland, two
major actors in the Arctic.
72. EC, CouncilDecision2001/431/ECof28 May 2001 on afinancialcontributionby the Community
to certain expenditure incurred by the Member States in implementing the control, inspection and
surveillancesystems applicableto the commonfisheries policy, [2011] OJ L 154/22:
The Commission may decide on a rate of contribution higher than that provided for in
paragraph 2, of up to 50% of eligible expenditure, in the following cases: (Article 9(3)
(a) to Member States which have to control an extensive Exclusive Economic Zone,
Exclusive Fishing Zone or continental shelf or which have to deal with disproportionate
obligations arising in connection with the control of fishing at sea.
73. EC, Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008
establishinga framework for community action in the field of marine environmentalpolicy (Marine
Strategy FrameworkDirective), [2008] OJ 164/19 states that:
"marine waters" means:
(a) waters, the seabed and subsoil on the seaward side of the baseline from which the
extent of territorial waters is measured extending to the outmost reach of the area
where a Member State has and/or exercises jurisdictional rights, in accordance with
the Unclos, with the exception of waters adjacent to the countries and territories
mentioned in Annex 11 to the Treaty and the French Overseas Departments and
Collectivities.
74. EC, Green Paper:Reform of the Common FisheriesPolicy,COM(2009) 163 final [Reform of the
Common FisheriesPolicy] at para 5.8.
75. Ibid at para 5.8.
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In addition, equal access to the Contracting Parties' ports is ensured,
unless the fish are taken from stocks over which disagreement over
management practices exists between the Contracting Parties.76 In its
conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries the Council expressed
the intention to "further strengthen[ing] cooperation with Iceland on
issues such as Arctic policy, the Northern Dimension, fisheries, renewable
energy and climate change."n
VI. Resource exploitation on the continentalshelf and in the
internationalseabed area
UNCLOS divides marine waters into various zones measured from the
relevant coastal State's baseline. The Territorial Sea of up to 12 nm from
the baseline is the zone in which the State exercises full sovereignty,
subject to the right of innocent passage to be exercised by ships of other
states. Seaward to 200 nm the State has more limited jurisdiction over
economic uses of the area, including the "sovereign right to explore and
exploit the natural resources, including those lying in the seabed,"" and to
exercise certain specified environmental jurisdictions. Beyond the 200 nm
limit, a state may be entitled to exploitation and management rights over
the continental shelf (but not the water column), subject to the limitations
imposed by Art. 76 of UNCLOS. The outer limits of the continental
shelf are to be determined in accordance with the criteria found in Art.
76, which defines the outer limits with reference to combined geological
and geomorphological factors. A state's potential claim is further limited
according to Art. 76.5: "the outer edge of the continental shelf shall not
exceed 350 nm from the baseline or 100 nm from the 2,500 meter isobath,
whichever is more favorable to the coastal State." The latter constraint is
particularly significant given the fact that most parts of the Arctic Ocean
are not deeper than 2,500 meters. It is on the basis of the Art. 76 criteria
that Canada, U.S.A., Denmark (representing Greenland), Russia, Norway
and possibly Iceland define their outer continental shelf claims to seabed
areas which would otherwise be within the International Seabed Area (i.e.,
outside of any coastal state's jurisdiction).
In order to establish the outer limits of an extended continental shelf
under UNCLOS a State has to make an application to the United Nations
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) providing
76. EEA Agreement, supra note 7 at art 5 Protocol 9.
77. EC, Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on EU relationswith EFTA countries,
(3060th General Affairs Council meeting, 2010) at para 14, online: Council of the European
Union <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsdata/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/1l8458.pdf>.
Reform of the Common FisheriesPolicy, supra note 72 at para 14.
78. UNCLOS, supra note 24 at art 56(l)(a).
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"supporting scientific and technical data.. .within 10 years after the entry
into force of [UNCLOS] for that State."7 9 Russia and Norway so far are the
only States that have submitted extended continental shelf claims for the
Arctic to the CLCS, whereas Denmark has made two partial submissions
outside the Arctic, in 2009 (areas north of the Faroes) and 2010 (south of
Greenland)." Furthermore, Denmark in August 2011 released a "Strategy
for the Arctic 2011-2020"8' in which it is said that Denmark's Science
Ministry has started collecting data to formally submit a claim for several
areas to the CLCS no later than 2014.82
The CLCS makes recommendations with regard to coastal State
submissions, and where the State defines its outer limits in accord with
those recommendations, such limits are to be considered "final and
binding," under Art. 76(8). Article 9, UNCLOS Annex II states expressly
that the CLCS's recommendations "shall not prejudice matters relating to
delimitation ofboundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts"
following Article 76(10) UNCLOS. Thus, the CLCS has no mandate to
either determine maritime boundaries between coastal States or to settle
disputes. In addition to their general obligations to settle any maritime
boundary disputes peacefully, in accordance with international law,
Articles 279, 287(1)(a-d) UNCLOS may oblige parties to the Convention,
where they have not agreed otherwise, to settle any such dispute between
them using the mandatory dispute settlement system provided for in the
Convention. Unfortunately, Article 298 UNCLOS allows a State to declare
that it does not accept such methods of resolution for disputes relating to
delimitation. Canada, Denmark and Russia have all issued declarations
of non-acceptance in relation to their respective Arctic claims. Bearing
in mind that the U.S. is not bound by UNCLOS, the dispute resolution
procedures of UNCLOS are currently only binding on Norway in this
regard, and the non-acceptance of the other Arctic States would preclude
any mandatory imposition of the procedures on Norway.

79. Ibid at Annex II,art 4.
80. See Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the
progress of work in the Commission at UNCLOS, 24th Sess, UN Doc LOS/CLCS/64 (2009) at 18.
81. Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Kingdom of Denmark Arctic Strategy 2011-2020
<http://um.dk/en/-/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-andonline:
(August
2011),
diplomacy/Arktis RapportUK_210x270_FinalWeb.pdf>.
82. Ibidat 14. Even if the CLCS receives all these applications in time, its decisions may not provide
a final and binding resolution of all Arctic outer continental shelf disputes. This is further complicated
by the fact that the United States is not yet a party to the UNCLOS and, therefore, not yet formally
bound. It is not yet clear whether the CLCS is a forum that has the capacity to provide final and binding
solutions.
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At this point it is not at all clear what role the EU can play in this
process. Matters of territorial sovereignty are still within exclusive
national jurisdiction, and EU Member States may well wish to keep the EU
entirely out of what may be a very contentious process. It is also possible
that it may be very difficult for the EU to develop a consensus on the
status of the Arctic Ocean's seabed. Many EU Member States, having no
Arctic coastline or continental shelf, may prefer to press for the maximum
international seabed area in order to have access to resources through the
UNCLOS legal regime, rather than to be forced to submit to the regulation
of a few Arctic states. This can only be a matter of speculation at this point.
VII. Environmentalprotection
According to Article 4.2(e) TFEU, environmental policy is shared between
Member States and the EU. The environmental policy of the EU is based on
the "integration principle,"" which implies that "environmental protection
requirements should be integrated into all EU policies according to the
principle of sustainable development." Contrary to other policies over
which Member States and EU share competence, Member States retain a
high level of competence over environmental policy issues. According to
Article 191.2 TFEU, "a high level of environmental protection is a goal
that should be pursued by member states taking into account the diversity
of situations in the different regions of the Union." Furthermore, Member
States maintain the power to "introduce other national provisions [...]"

even after the "adoption of harmonization measure[s]" at the EU level
if these provisions are "based on new scientific evidence" concerning
the "protection of the environment" or related issues.84 Member States
are usually entitled to "introduc[e] more stringent [...] measures" than
those incorporated in the EU harmonization directives, so long as they are
"compatible with the Treaties.""
According to TFEU Articles 191-193, the actions of the EU regarding
environmental protection should be designed to preserve, protect and
improve the quality of the environment, protect human health, rationally
and prudently utilize natural resources and put in place strategies to fight
climate change. This principle applies to the treaties the EU signs. For
this reason, the EU can reasonably be expected to support the adoption
of environmentally responsible measures in the Arctic. The EU has
enacted a number of policies within the general competence it has over
83. Consolidatedversion of the Treaty on European Union, [2010] OJ L 83/13 at art 11 [TEU];
TFEU, supra note 20 at art 114.3
84. Ibid, art 114.5.
85.

lbid, art 193.
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environmental protection. The most important aspects of this policy for
the Arctic are those related to the regulation of marine pollution, climate
change, prevention of natural disasters and civil protection.
1. Marinepollution
The position that might be taken by the EU concerning marine pollution in
the Arctic, particularly pollution from ships navigating in the Arctic, may
pose problems for Canada and Russia. This is because these two states have
committed to regulate navigation in Arctic waters under their jurisdiction.
The level of conflict will depend on whether the EU takes a strong position
to reduce pollution from ships or whether, under the guise of protecting
EU registered ships' freedom of navigation, it decides to restrict pollution
prevention measures to those based on strictly international standards. So
far the indications are limited but positive from the Canadian and Russian
perspective.
Directive 32/1999,6 concerning the sulphur content of marine fuels,
which potentially applies to EU ships traveling in Arctic waters states:
Member States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that marine
fuels are not used in the areas of their territorial seas, exclusive economic
zones and pollution control zones falling within SOx Emission Control
Areas if the sulphur content of those fuels exceeds 1,5 %by mass. This
shall apply to all vessels of all flags, including vessels whose journey
began outside the Community."
Directive81/2001 on national emission ceilings for certain atmospheric
pollutants may also be relevant. This Directive applies only within member
states' territories and their EEZs. International maritime traffic is explicitly
excluded." Yet, it is applicable to the part of the Arctic that is included
within the territories of EU Arctic Member States and for intra-EU traffic.

86. EC, Council Directive 1999/32/EC of26April 1999 relatingto a reduction in the sulphur content
of certain liquidfuels and amending Directive 93/12/EEC, [ 1999] OJ L 121/12 [Directive 32/1999];
As amended by Directive 2005/33/EC of the EuropeanParliamentand of the Council of 6 July 2005
amending Directive 1999/32/EC, [2005] OJ L 191/59.
87. EC, Directive 2005/33/EC of the European Parliament and Council, 6 July 2005, amending
Directive 1999/32/EC, Article 4a. This provision also designates the Baltic Sea, the North Sea and the
English Channel as sulphur emission control areas (SECAs) and limits the maximum sulphur content
of the fuels used by ships operating in these sea areas to 1.5%; in doing so, it transposes provisions
of Annex VI of IMO's Marine Pollution Convention, MARPOL 73/78. The European Parliament
and the Council have requested the Commission to report on the implementation of the Directive
and to consider submitting a proposal for an amendment. Following this request and considering the
development at the IMO in 2008, the Commission carried out a review of the Directive and adopted a
proposal for its revision on 15 July 2011.
88. EC, Directive 2001/81/EC of the EuropeanParliament and of the Council of 23 October 2001
on nationalemission ceilingsfor certain atmosphericpollutants, [2011]OJ L 309/22 at art 2(c).
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In 2008, the Maritime Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD)8 9 entered
into force and it requires Member States to take measures to achieve or
maintain high environmental standards in the marine environment by
2020 through adaptive management. This Directive applies in EU ports
and in EU EEZs. This Directive also provides that the Arctic waters
are a "neighboring marine environment of particular importance for the
[EU]" and that "climate change" concerns "need to be [addressed] by the
[Union's] institutions and may require action [by the EU] to ensure the
environmental protection of the Arctic." 90 In addition, in its conclusions
on Integrated Maritime Policy,91 the Council invites the Commission to
present "proposals for the financing of integrated maritime policy actions,"
including the environmental protection of the Arctic. This highlights the
importance of funding further development and implementation of the
IMP.
2. Climate change
Climate change is given special consideration in Article 191 TFEU as
a worldwide environmental problem, which requires the promotion of
measures at the international level. Despite the failure of the Copenhagen
Conference on Climate Change, the EU has enacted the so called "20-2020 package."9 2 In addition, the climate change policy of the EU is based on
the second European Climate Change Programme (ECCP II), launched in
2005. In the ECCP II there is no specific focus or sub-group activity on the
Arctic region. However, more specific reference to the Arctic was made
since. A paper presented to the Council, "Climate Change and International
Security," discusses that climate change mutations in the Arctic region are
opening new maritime commercial routes. 93 Furthermore, the "increased

89. EC, Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008
establishinga framework for community action in the field of marine environmentalpolicy (Marine
Strategy Framework Directive), [2008] OJ L 164/19.
90. ibid at 42.
91. EC, Council of the European Union, Press Release, Council Conclusions on an Integrated
maritimepolicy, 2973rd General Affairs Council meeting, (16 November 2009), online: Council of the
European Union <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/ 11184.
pdf> at 6.
92. See EC, The 2010/C 141/09 Own-initiative opinion of the Committee of the Regions on forest
policy: the 20/20/20 targetsof29 May 2010, [2010] OJ L 141/45. This requires the reduction of 20%
of greenhouse emissions below 1990 level by 2020; 20% of EU energy consumption to come from
renewable resources; and a 20% reduction in primary energy use compared with projected levels, to
be achieved by improving energy efficiency.
93. EC, High Representative, European Commission, Climate Change and InternationalSecurity:
Paper by the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, S 113/08
(14 March 2008), online: Council of the European Union <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cmsdata/docs/pressdatalen/reports/99387.pdf>.
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accessibility" to hydrocarbon resources affects "the geo-strategic dynamics
of the region with potential consequences for international stability and
European security interests."94 The 2008 follow-up report,95 endorsed by
the Council in 2009, underlines the importance of satellite monitoring of
climate change, security and disaster response. In connection with the
Arctic, a later progress report said that "[c]limate change-related activities
where satellite imagery analysis bring added value include monitoring
Arctic ice-fields to assess the practicability of new Arctic routes, updating
coastline changes and monitoring of water as a valuable and scarce asset." 96
3. Security and civil protection
Civil protection policy has now been upgraded as an autonomous policy
included in the TFEU Art. 196 in the Lisbon Treaty. Member States
maintain their competence for civil protection; nevertheless, the EU has
competence to support, coordinate and supplement their actions in order
to guarantee prompt and effect reaction in case of natural disasters. This
competence has the potential to be of significance for the Arctic, due to the
increase of human activities in the Arctic, and in particular oil and natural
gas extraction.
In the case of oil spills in marine waters the civil protection directorate
would act in coordination with the European Maritime Safety Agency
and non-EU regional partners. The EU, in fact, has signed or promoted a
number of agreements assuring cooperation in civil protection action. The
relevant agreements for the Arctic are the 2008 inter-regional agreement
on emergency prevention, preparedness and response between Finland,
Norway, Sweden and Russia and the 2004 bilateral arrangement between the
EU civil protection service and its Russian counterpart.97 The geographical
scope of Decision 2850/2000, "setting up a Community framework for

94. Ibid at 8.
95. EC, Council of the European Union, Climate Change and Security: Recommendations of the
High Representative on follow-up to the High Representative and Commission report on Climate
Change and InternationalSecurity, 16994/1/08 REV I (10 December 2008), online: Council of the
European Union <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st16/stl6994-re0l.enO8.pdf>.
96. EC, Council of the European Union, Joint progress report andfollow-up recommendations on
climate change and internationalsecurity (CCIS) to the Council, 16645/09 (25 November 2009) at 8,
online: Council of the European Union <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/stl6/stl6645.
en09.pdf>.
97. Protocol to the Partnershipand Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part,and the Russian Federation,of
the other part, to take account of the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Hungary,the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, and
the Slovak Republic to the European Union, 27 April 2004, [2006] OJ L185/17 [entered into force
1 March 2005].
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cooperation in the field of accidental or deliberate marine pollution,"
is limited to "national, regional and local levels," with the exclusion of
"pollution originating from land-based sources."" Article 1(2) of the
Council Decision establishing the Mechanism, states that the mechanism
applies to "emergencies [that occur] inside or outside the Community."99
Thus the scope of this measure goes beyond the community territory and
waters. This is particularly relevant for the Arctic region, as the Mechanism
covers environmental accidents, including accidental marine pollution.
VIII. Scientific researchprogrammes relatedto the Arctic
Article 4.3 of the TFEU establishes that research is a shared competence.
The EU has competence to carry out research activities, but the exercise
of this competence cannot be an obstacle to the exercise of Member
States' competence. Thus both the EU and Member States are obliged
to "coordinate their research and technological.. .activities" in order to
render them "mutually consistent." 0 0 To this end, the Commission shall
take specific coordination initiatives. The competence of the EU in this
field is exercised by the establishment and implementation of multiannual
framework programmes 10' For the establishment of framework programmes
the consent of the European Parliament is required, whereas in the case of
special programmes, it only has a consultative role.
The EU has launched and carried out several research programmes
focusing specifically on the Arctic or the polar regions-including
Antarctica. Typically these programmes have lasted 24 to 48 months.
In terms of budget, a precise estimation of the total amount of the funds
destined to research in the Arctic is not available, nevertheless, in a recent
speech, EU Commissioner for Maritime Policy, Ms. Maria Daminaki, has
claimed that "in the last decade the European Commission has spent 200
million euro on Arctic research projects which focuses on key areas such
as sea ice retreating and thinning, rising sea levels and Arctic pollution." 02

98. EC, Decision No 2850/2000/EC ofthe European Parliamentand of the Council of20 December
2000 setting up a Community framework for cooperation in the field of accidental or deliberate
marine pollution, [2000] OJ L332/1 at art 1.
99. EC, Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community
Civil Protection Mechanism, [2007] OJ L 314/9 at (6).
100. TFEU, supra note 20 at art 181.1.
101. Ibidat art 182.
102. Maria Damanaki, "The Arctic: a Test Bench for International Dialogue" (Arctic Science,
International Law and Climate Protection Conference delivered at Berlin, 17 March 2011)
SPEECH/11/192, online: European Union <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference
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1. SIOS-Towards an integratedarctic earth observation system (SIOS)
The EU has contributed with goal No 4 of SIOS to establish an observational
research infrastructure for the Arctic Earth System, integrating studies of
geophysical, chemical and biological processes from the research and
monitoring platforms.
2. ArcRisk
Arctic Health Risks is a project dealing with the impact on health in the
Arctic resulting from climate-induced changes in contaminant cycling. It
benefits from EU funding.
3. EUArctic Footprint
The EU Arctic Footprint and. Policy Assessment Project (EU Arctic
Footprint) is a project launched by the European Commission as a first
attempt at calculating Europe's contribution to the impact of environmental
degradation on the Arctic environment and inhabitants. This project
also examines the effectiveness of EU policies in mitigating adverse
environmental Arctic impacts. The aim of Arctic Footprint is to "improve
the effectiveness of EU environmental policies with respect to the Arctic
region," especially as they relate to the implementation of existing policies
and a new Arctic Policy for the EU. The Final Report was released in
2010.103

4. Ice2sea
Ice2sea is a collaborative research program involving 24 institutional
partners. Ice2sea is a research program specifically focused on the
contribution to sea-level rise that will arise from loss of continental glaciers
and ice sheets and which gives rise to the largest part of the uncertainty
in the projections. This program involves 24 institutional partners and the
European Commission contributes with 10 million Euros. The program
will run until 2013. Part of this research is held in the Arctic region, notably
in Greenland and Svalbard Archipelago (Norway).
5. EUROPOLAR
EUROPOLAR is a consortium composed of 25 Government Ministries,
National Funding Agencies and National Polar RTD Authorities from 19

103. Sandra Cavalieri et al, Arctic Footprintand PolicyAssessment: Final Report (Berlin: Ecologic
Institute, 2010) at 16, 19, 20, 31 and 41, online: The EU Arctic Footprint <http://www.arctic-footprint.
eu/sites/default/files/AFPAFinal Report.pdf>. According to the Report, the EU share of global transboundary pollution in the Arctic varies: 35% of Hexachlorobenzene (HCB) (data of 2005), 27% of
mercury (data of 2005) and 43% of SO 2. As of greenhouse house emissions EU impact on the Arctic is
16 % (data of 2007). As of energy, the EU receives 24% of the total output of the Arctic oil and natural
gas industry, including pipeline transportation.
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European Member States and the European Polar Board. This consortium
intends to coordinate European Polar research technological development
RTD programs in order to deepen and strengthen the interactions between
countries with significant Polar RTD programs.
6. The Arctic tipping points
The Arctic Tipping Points was launched in February 2009 with a budget
of 4.9 million Euros, for a duration of 36 months. Its major aims were
to identify elements of the Arctic marine ecosystem which show abrupt
modifications caused by climate change, examine climate drivers inducing
the regime shift for these elements, analyze the impact of activities that
are strategically important for the EU in the Arctic ecosystems, examine
possible alternative post-Kyoto policies and stabilization targets to avoid
tipping points. This was carried out by the EU in partnership with Russia
and Greenland.
Conclusions
Despite many efforts to develop a coherent policy for the Arctic, the EU
still has a very restricted and contested role in the region. The refusal
of the Arctic Council Member States to accept the EU as a permanent
observer demonstrates the hostility of the other Arctic stakeholders as well
as of indigenous peoples. Yet the pace of climate change is escalating,
causing a progressive melting of the ice, which in turn suggests that the
region has potential both in terms of natural resources and navigation
routes.10 The EU, like other Arctic stakeholders, has an interest in the
division of the seabed of the Arctic Ocean, and its impact on the remaining
areas of international seabed. So far, this situation has generated a pacta
ad excludendum, rather than strategic cooperation agreements: we refer
here to the Ilussat declaration,106 a document adopted by the five major
Arctic States (U.S.A., Canada, Russia, Denmark, and Norway) in an
attempt to leave out other states, specifically on matters of exploitation
of natural resources. This strategy is particularly harmful to the EU's
interests, due to the fact that one EU country, Denmark, by signing the
Ilussat declaration, has now adopted a strategy potentially conflicting with
the Union's interests. This may seriously hinder the full construction of
a EU strategy in the Arctic, because consensus within the Union may be
104. The European Polar Board (EPB) is Europe's strategic advisory body on science policy in the
Arctic and Antarctic. Itis a platform for European engagement in international science programmes
and provides strategic science policy advice to the European Commission and international bodies.
105. See Malte Humpert, EU Arctic Policy: A Memorandum to the European Commission,
(Washington, DC: The Arctic Institute Publication, 2011) at para 2.1.
106. Ilulissat,supra note 5.

The EU as an Arctic power: Analysis of the Competence
of the EU in the Arctic by Policy Areas

355

difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, while consensus of all Member States is
necessary to act within the formal common foreign and security policy, the
external dimensions of other policies, notably those in which the EU has
exclusive or shared competences, remain relevant for the Arctic region.
EU external action may certainly cover Arctic fisheries conducted'by
ships flying the flag of a EU member state. The EU is also party to several
RMFOs, as it is endowed of treaty making powers within the fishery
sector. The possible enlargement of the mandate of the North-East Atlantic
Fishery Commission to parts of the Arctic can only lead to a greater impact
of the Union in that region. As for the regulation of pollution from ships, it
is certainly possible to envisage the adoption of EU regulations of certain
forms of ship-source pollution. Beyond this, the EU certainly has the
authority to join international environment agreements and legal regimes
which may extend to the Arctic.
The participation of the EU within specialized international
instruments that are relevant for the Arctic may well strengthen the hand of
the EU in its sometimes difficult dialogue with other Arctic stakeholders.
In addition to this, the EU has tremendous economic influence which
could play a determinant role to influence Arctic policies. Finally, the
institutional innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, such as the
strengthening of the role of the High Representative of the Union Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy as well the creation of the European External
Action Service, may contribute significantly to providing the Union with
a stronger voice in the Arctic.
How should Canada view the emergence of the EU as an Arctic power?
So far the Canadian reaction has been very guarded and little has been
done to open a dialogue. Given the potential impact of the EU on Arctic
policy, dialogue would deem to be more constructive policy for Canada
than hesitation and distrust. The fact is that the EU can be a great support
for Canadian policies if it chooses to do so, although the contrary is also
possible. It is possible that the EU will take up the concerns of its maritime
State Members who continue to call for recognition of the Northwest
Passage as an international strait and the application of the transit passage
regime, who insist on the primacy of international standards for ships
in the Arctic over those adopted by Canada, and who apparently adopt
a restrictive meaning of UNCLOS article 234 (providing for enhanced
environmental jurisdiction over ice-covered waters). This would not be in
Canada's best interests. To avoid this unfortunate outcome, Canada should
engage the EU and ensure that the accent is put on its duty to promote high
standards of environmental protection in all its dealings both internal and
external. The EU could be a redoubtable ally in future debates over these
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issues. Canada should do all that it can to make the EU an ally, rather than
an opponent on these issues.

